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Abstract 
Prices for consultations with General Practitioners (GPs) in Australia are unregulated, and 
patients pay the difference between the price set by the GP and a fixed reimbursement from 
the national tax-funded Medicare insurance scheme. We construct a Vickrey-Salop model of 
GP price and quality competition and test its predictions using individual GP-level data on 
prices, the proportion of patients who are charged no out-of-pocket fee, average consultation 
length, and characteristics of the GPs, their practices and their local areas. We measure the 
competition to which the GP is exposed by the distance to other GP practices and allow for 
the endogeneity of GP location decisions with measures of area characteristics and area fixed-
effects. Within areas, GPs with more distant competitors charge higher prices and a smaller 
proportion of their patients make no out-of-pocket payment. GPs with more distant competi-
tors also have shorter consultations, though the effect is small and statistically insignificant. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Market structure may have important effects on healthcare costs, quality and access.  The 
majority of studies in the literature have examined the effect of competition in hospital or 
insurance markets; there are few studies of the market for physician services (Gaynor and 
Town, 2011). In this paper we examine the effects of competition on the prices and quality of 
general practitioner (GP) consultations using rich GP level data from Australia.   
 
In Australia patients pay a fee for each GP consultation. The fees that GPs charge are not reg-
ulated and GPs are free to price discriminate between patients.  The national, tax financed, 
Medicare insurance scheme provides a subsidy for the cost of a consultation (the Medicare 
rebate).  The patient pays the excess of the GP fee over the Medicare rebate and these out of 
pocket co-payments by patients FDQQRWEH FRYHUHGE\ LQVXUDQFH*3V FDQFKRRVH WR µEXON-
ELOO¶DSDWLHQW VR WKDW WKHSDWLHQWSD\VQRWKLQJ WR WKHGP who claims the rebate direct from 
Medicare as full payment.  Patients can consult any GP: there is no list system. In this con-
text, the role of competition between GPs is a key mechanism that may influence GP pricing 
and quality. However, the effect of competition in healthcare markets remains an unresolved 
issue (Gaynor and Town, 2011; Gaynor et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2012).   
 
We make two contributions. First, building on previous work (Gravelle 1999, Brekke et al 
2010), we develop a model of GP price and quality discrimination under bulk-billing with 
free entry into GP markets. We use it to generate predictions about the effects of competition, 
as measured by distance between GPs, as a guide to our empirical analysis.   
 
Second, we use within-area variation in prices and distance between GP practices, to identify 
the effects of competition. We use area fixed effects to control for all area-level variables that 
are unobserved and may influence prices and GP supply in an area.  The areas we use have an 
average population of about 33,000, so that they are small enough to capture the locational 
preferences of GPs when choosing where to practice, but large enough to provide within-area 
variation in prices and distance between GP practices. Our distance measure of competitive 
pressure follows a strand in the industrial economics literature which emphasizes distance to 
nearby competitors as a determinant of prices (Alderighi and Piga, 2012; Thomadsen, 2005).  
Distance between firms has also been found to affect prices in studies of hospital competition 
(Gaynor and Vogt 2003). Our within-area approach contrasts with the previous literature 
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which has sought to identify the effect of physician competition  using variation in area level 
measures of competition, such as the number of physicians per head of area population. 
These area-level measures may be correlated with unobservable area demand or cost condi-
tions that affect pricing behavior.  In our models we can also control for a rich set of GP-level 
variables (including gender, experience, country of qualification, whether the GP is a partner 
or employee in their practice, and the size of their practice).  
 
Our empirical findings are consistent with the predictions from our theoretical model.  GPs 
whose rivals are further away, bulk-bill (charge zero copayment to) a smaller proportion of 
their patients and charge higher prices to those they do not bulk-bill. The effects of competi-
tion on bulk-billing and prices are stronger in areas of greater socio-economic advantage.  
Distance to other GP practices also reduces quality, though the effects are generally not statis-
tically significant.   
 
Our study contributes to hotly debated topic (Gaynor et al, 2012) of the effect of competition 
on health care provider behavior.  It is also relevant for other health systems with unregulated 
physician prices.  In the US, charging fees above the price reimbursed by the insurer is 
known as balance billing (Glazer and McGuire, 1993; McKnight, 2007) and is generally ille-
gal for Medicare services or services under managed care plans. Balance billing is permitted 
for uninsured elective services or where patients visit providers who are not contracted to the 
same health plan as the patient (out-of-network services). It is also permitted in some prov-
inces in Canada (Sullivan and Baranek, 2002).  In France and Germany GPs can choose a 
contract that SHUPLWV WKHPWRFKDUJHIHHVDERYHWKHIL[HGLQVXUDQFHUHEDWH/¶+DULGRQHWDO
2008; Busse and Reisberg, 2004). In many developing countries out-of-pocket payments are 
often uncapped and insurance provides only limited financial protection, for example in Chi-
na (Hu et al., 2008) and South Korea (Chun et al., 2009).  Our results on the pricing and qual-
ity setting behavior of GPs provide a useful reference for policy work in these countries and 
in countries wishing to deregulate prices.   
 
 
1.1 Related Literature  
 
Studies including theoretical models of physician competition and pricing behaviour include 
Glazer and McGuire (1993), who use a two-firm Hotelling model to examine how prices, 
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bulk-billing and quality vary with patient location. Savage and Jones (2004) model bulk-
billing by monopolistically competitive GPs but do not examine the effects of an increase in 
the number of GPs.  Brekke et al (2010) have a Vickrey-Salop circular city model with a 
fixed number of doctors and all patients facing the same price and quality. There is no patient 
insurance and so no possibility of bulk-billing. Gravelle (1999) examines price and quality in 
a Vickrey-Salop model and allows for entry by doctors, but does not consider bulk-billing.   
 
In the first empirical study of prices and competition in physician markets, Pauly and Sat-
terthwaite (1981) use data on 92 US metropolitan areas. After instrumenting for physician 
supply with measures of area attractiveness, they find that areas with more physicians per 
capita have lower prices. More recently, Bradford and Martin (2000) report that higher physi-
cian density (physicians per head of population) is associated with less profit sharing amongst 
physicians in group practices and lower prices. Schneider et al (2008) find that physician 
market concentration in California, measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
associated with higher prices.  Gunning and Sickles (2012) adopt the Bresnahan (1989) struc-
tural approach with price and cost data to measure the competitiveness of physician markets 
and conclude that these markets, including a submarket for GPs, are not competitive.  
 
There have been four area level studies of pricing by Australian GPs. Richardson et al (2006) 
use 1995 data on 187 Australian statistical sub-divisions and instrument GP supply with area 
socio-economic status and the supply of private schools.  They report that areas with more 
GPs per capita have higher prices to patients who are not bulk-billed but also have a higher 
proportion of patients who are bulk-billed, so that the average price to all patients is unaffect-
ed by GP supply. Savage and Jones (2004) use a 1989/90-2000/01 panel of data for the eight 
Australian states.  After controlling for state and year fixed effects, they find that increases in 
GPs per capita increase the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed.  McCrae (2009) uses a 
panel of data from 1996-2003 on all 816 Australian Statistical Local Areas. After instrument-
ing GP supply with area characteristics, an increase in area GP supply is found to be associat-
ed with higher prices. In a recent study, Johar (2012) uses patient-level data to examine the 
relationship between prices and patient income. She finds that in areas with more GPs the 
effect of patient income on price is reduced.  
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2 Institutional setting 
 
0HGLFDUHLV$XVWUDOLD¶Vnational tax-financed universal health insurance scheme, which sub-
sidises medical services provided by GPs and medical specialists outside of hospitals, phar-
maceuticals, and provides around half of the funding for public hospitals with $XVWUDOLD¶V
eight State and territory governments contributing the rest.  GPs work in practices owned by 
GP partnerships or by companies. GP practices vary in size, from solo practices up to practic-
es with around 10 GPs.  Revenue is generated through fee-for-service for each consultation.  
The prices paid by patients are subsidised by Medicare and patients can claim back a fixed 
rebate from Medicare as set out in the Medicare Benefits Schedule (Australian Government, 
2008). Different types of consultation (defined in terms of complexity and length) have dif-
ferent Medicare rebates. 1  
 
Although the Australian Medical Association (AMA) publishes a consultation fee guideline,2 
it is not binding on GPs and there is no government regulation of fees.  GPs can price dis-
criminate and are free to set prices in response to market conditions. Since consultations are 
personal services, there are no arbitrage constraints to prevent GPs setting different prices and 
providing consultations of differing lengths to different types of patient.  In particular, they 
can bulk-bill a proportion of their patients, charging a zero co-payment. Medicare sets a high-
er rebate for GPs who bulk-bill children under 16 and those on low incomes who hold gov-
ernment concession cards. Approximately half of the population hold private health insurance 
but this can only be used to cover hospital, dentistry and allied health services, not co-
payments to GPs. 
 
                                                 
1
 The Medicare Benefits Schedule has four categories of consultation (Australian Government, 2008).  Level A 
services are simple consultations with limited examination, for example a consultation for a tetanus immunisa-
tion. Level B consultations are more complex than Level A and include history taking, advice giving, ordering 
tests, formulation and implementation of a management plan.  Level C consultations are more complex than 
level B and must last at least 20 minutes. Level D consultations are yet more complex and must last at least 40 
minutes.  In 2008, level B and C consultations accounted for 88.4%  and 10.5% of consultations and levels A 
and D together accounted for just over 1%. 
2
 The AMA List of Medical Services and Fees is available for AMA members online at 
(https://ama.com.au/policy/doctors-fees). 
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Australia has no enrolment of patients or list system, and so patients can choose to visit any 
GP practice.  GPs are gatekeepers to specialist and hospital services, though patients can ac-
cess hospital services directly through emergency departments which can substitute for GP 
services. For GPs, there are no restrictions on geographical location of practice, apart from 
doctors arriving from overseas who must first practice for a set period in under-doctored rural 
areas.  GPs in rural areas are eligible for a range of additional payments to encourage them to 
locate and remain in these areas. These issues do not affect our data which are for GPs in 
metropolitan areas.   
 
 
3 A model of bulk-billing, price and quality  
 
3.1 Specification 
 
We examine the effect of competition on *3V¶ GHFLVLRQV E\ H[WHQGLQJ WKH 9LFNUH\-Salop 
model of monopolistically competitive firms (Vickrey, 1964; Salop, 1979) to include choice 
of quality as well as prices.  We also allow for the possibility that GPs bulk-bill (ie charge a 
price equal to the Medicare rebate) for a proportion of their patients.   
 
Under the Medicare system the GP receives a gross fee per consultation of p +  m, the patient 
reclaims the rebate m from Medicare and pays a net price of p.3  Each patient demands at 
most one consultation per period and the utility gain from a consultation at GP j is 
  uj =  r  pj ĮTj  tdj                (1) 
where pj is the price the patient pays at GP j, qj is the quality of the consultation (measured by 
its length), dj is the distance to the GP, Į[Į0Į1] and t are taste parameters. We assume that r 
is large enough to ensure that the market is covered: all patients demand a consultation. All 
patients have the same marginal distance cost t. They differ in their marginal valuation of 
                                                 
3
 Strictly, the amount the patient can reclaim from Medicare is the minimum of the gross price and the Medicare 
rebate limit m:  min{p+m, m}.  Thus the net amount paid by the patient is p+m  min{p+m,m} =  p min{p,0} 
=  max{p,0}.   This implies that it can never be optimal for the GP to set p <  0. Increasing p to 0 would have no 
effect on demand, since the net amount paid by the patient is unchanged, and so would increase revenue with no 
change in cost.  Hence, the net amount paid by the patient is max{p,0} =  p.  Without loss of generality we im-
pose the constraint p t 0 in the GP's profit maximisation problem below.  
 7 
quality (Į).  If instead patients had different travel costs t the model would yield similar pre-
dictions, with patients with higher travel costs, who are less willing to shop around, being set 
higher prices and offered lower quality. 
 
There are H patients in total in the market, distributed uniformly around the circular market 
of length L, so that the density of patients at any point in the market is h =  H/L.  The proba-
bility distribution and density functions of patient types, F(D;ș) and f(D;ș), are independent of 
location within the market, so that at each point there are hf(D;T) patients of type D.  The pa-
rameter T  shifts the patient type distribution. We assume that FT < 0 so that markets with 
higher T  have a larger mean valuations of quality. 
 
There are G GPs equally spaced around the market so that the distance between GPs is = 
L/G.  GPs observe patient types i.e. their taste for quality.  There are no legal restrictions on 
their pricing decisions.  Since GPs are selling a personal service there is no problem with 
arbitrage if they set different prices or provide different length consultations to different pa-
tients.  We therefore assume that a GP can sets prices and qualities which can differ according 
WKHSDWLHQW¶VWDVWHIRUTXDOity D.    
 
The demand for GP j from type Į patients depends on the price pj(Į) she charges them and 
the quality qj(Į) she provides, as well as the prices and qualities of her immediately neigh-
bouring GPs:4 
 ^ `1 1( ; ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]2j j j j jhfD p p q q ttD T D D D D D        
     ^ `1 1( ; ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]2 j j j jhf p p q q ttD T D D D D D         
      1 1 1 1( ( ), ( ); ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , , , )j j j j j j jD p q p q p q hD D D D D D D T               (2) 
where the first term is demand from patients between GP j and GP  j + 1 and the second is 
demand from patients between GP j and GP j  1.   The average variable cost of serving pa-
tients who get quality q is ½įT2.5  
                                                 
4
 See Gravelle (1999), Brekke et al (2010). 
5
 One set of reasonable assumptions implying this cost function is that that the cost of GP time is linear, and the 
quality of consultation increases with GP time (consultation length) but at a decreasing rate.  For example, with 
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GP j¶V profit is  
     
1
0
21
2( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ); ) ( ; )j j j j j jp m q D p q f d
D
DS D G D D D D T Dª º   ¬ ¼³    
       1
0
( ), ( ); ( ; )j jp q f d
D
D S D D D T D ³                    (3) 
Given that the profit function is separable across patient types, the GP chooses pj(Į), and qj(Į) 
to maximises ʌ(pj(D),qj(D);·), subject to the constraint that pj(Į) t 0.6  The first order condi-
tions are 
( ) ( ( ), ( ); )
j
jp j j jD p qDS D D  2 112 0( ) ( ) ( ; )j jp m q hf tD G D D T  dª º  ¬ ¼ , 
( )( ) 0, ( ) 0j
j
j j qp p DD D St                   (4) 
    
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ); )j
j
q j j j jq D p qDS G D D D   2 112( ) ( ) ( ; ) 0j jp m q hf tD G D D D T ª º    ¬ ¼  (5)
 
where ( ) ( ),j j
j j
p qD DS S  are the partial derivatives of jS  with respect to pj(Į), and qj(Į). 
 
With identical GPs, the Nash equilibrium has all GPs choosing the same price and quality for 
each type of patient (D).  Dropping the GP subscript, at the equilibrium each GP has 
( ( ), ( ); )D p qD D   = hf(Į;ș)  patients of type D 
   
Consider first the price charged to those patients who face a positive price p(D) > 0.  Substi-
tuting hf(Į;ș)  for D(p(D), q(D);) in (4) we get p(D) = t + 212 ( )qG D  m.   For patients fac-
ing a positive price we can substitute this expression in the first order condition (5) for quality 
to get q(D) = 1DG  .   Substituting this back into the expression for the price gives p(D) = t + 
2 1(2 )D G   m for patients who face a positive price.   This expression is increasing in D.  Let 
Db = denote the threshold level of D satisfying p(D) = t + 2 1(2 )D G   m = 0, so that Db = 
> @122 ( )m tG  .  All patients with a taste for quality less than Db, are charged a zero price.  For 
these patients we must solve the quadratic first order condition (5) to determine quality.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
z denoting the length of the consultation and Z the constant marginal cost of consultation time, if the quality of a 
consultation is q = 
1
2zJ , then cost per consultation of quality q is Gq2/2, whereG { 2Z/J 2.   
6
 See footnote 3 which demonstrates that this constraint is without loss of generality 
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Thus the symmetric Nash equilibrium prices and qualities for patients vary with their quality 
taste parameter according to     
 ( ; , , , )bp t mD G  0,     
1
22 2( ) 2( ; , , , )b b t m tq q t m G D G GD G DG
ª º ¬ ¼  , D  d Db     (6) 
 ( ; , , , )nbp t mD G  
2
2
t m
D
G   > 0, ( ; , , , )
nb nbq q t m DD G G  ,          D 
 > Db    (7) 
> @12( , , , ) 2 ( )b b t m m tD D G G                  (8) 
 
and the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed is 
 
0
( , , , ) ( ; ) ( , , , );
b t mb bF dF d F t m
D G
D D T D D G T  ³                      (9) 
 
Irrespective of whether they are bulk-billed or not, patients with higher marginal valuations 
(Į) of quality will receive higher quality.7  A given increase in quality will generate a bigger 
increase in demand (at given price), and thus higher marginal revenue from quality, from pa-
tients with higher D . Patients with higher D have a marginal willingness to pay for a consul-
tation and so, if they co-pay and are not bulk-billed, the price they pay increases with D.  
 
3.2 Model predictions 
 
We do not observe prices and quality for individual patients but we do have data (see section 
4.1) on summary measures of GPs decisions:    
a) the average price charged to patients who are not bulk-billed (m + nbp ); 
b) the proportion of each GP's patients who are bulk-billed Fb =F(Db,T ); 
c) the average price charged to all patients (  ( ) (1 )b b nbp F m F m p u    = m + 
(1 )b nbF p ; 
d) the average quality of a GP ( q ) (as measured by average consultation time for all her 
patients); 
e) the number of patients seen per GP (N = H/G) (as measured by the number of consul-
tations per week) 
                                                 
7
 qj(D) is increasing and continuous in D (since Lim ( ) /b b bqD D D D Go  ), though wqj(D)/wD is discontinuous at 
Db. 
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We use the model to derive predictions about how these variables respond to an increase in 
the distance between GPs (  = L/G) which we interpret as a decrease in competition in the 
market.  The first five columns in Table 1 summarise the comparative static properties of the 
model when the number of GPs (and hence ) is fixed.8 The table shows the ceteris paribus 
effects of changes in , m, G, t, h, T  on the five variables we observe in our data.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
It is immediate from (8) that an increase in the distance between GPs (less competition) re-
duces the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed.   
 
The effect of reduced competition on the average price to non-bulk-billed patients ( nbp ) is 
ambiguous.  After a reduction in competition there are two groups of patients who pay a posi-
tive price (i.e. are not bulk-billed).  The first group are those who were paying a positive price 
before the reduction in competition.  The reduction in competition increases the price they 
face.  The second group are those who were previously bulk-billed ie who faced a zero price.  
They now pay a positive price but because, they have a lower marginal valuation of quality 
than the first group, all of them pay less than the prices paid by the first group.  If this second 
group is large enough the average price paid by the two groups could be reduced.  If it is 
small enough the average price will be increased.   
 
The average price paid across all patients is p = m + (1Fb) nbp  and this will increase when 
competition is reduced since the price for every patient is either increased or unchanged. 
Those patients who continue to be bulk-billed face an unchanged (zero) price.  Patients who 
were previously bulk-billed now face a positive price, and those who were previously not 
bulk-billed pay a higher price than before.    
 
Reduced competition leads GPs to reduce the quality provided to bulk-billed patients because 
quality is the only way to attract these patients. Competition has no effect on the quality they 
provide to non-bulk-billed patients.  Thus average quality is reduced if there is less competi-
tion.  
                                                 
8
 The detailed derivations are in the Appendix. 
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The parameter ș shifts the distribution function of patient types. Increases in șdo not affect 
prices or quality for given types of patient but they do reduce the proportion who are bulk-
billed. Our assumption that an increase in ș gives a first order stochastic dominating distribu-
tion of the willingness to pay for quality implies bFT =  ( , , , );bF t mT D G T < 0 so that the pro-
portion of patients who are bulk-billed is reduced.  First order stochastic dominance implies, 
since price is either constant or increasing in Įand quality is increasing in Į (see(6), (7)), that 
both p and q increase with ș.  We can show that although the effect of T  on /bFw w  and 
/nbpw w , are ambiguous, increases in T  make /pw w more positive and /qw w  more nega-
tive. Thus in markets with higher T  a reduction in competition will lead to greater reductions 
in average quality and greater increases in average price.  
 
Finally, an increase in  increases the workload or number of patients seen by each GP.  Be-
cause the market is covered, the workload of each GP is equal to the distance between GPs 
times the number of patients per unit of distance: N = h = (L/G) (H/L) = H/G.  Hence an 
increase in the distance between GPs or an increase in population density must increase 
workload. 
 
3.3 Endogeneity of competition 
 
We test for the effects of reduced competition (increased ) by estimating cross-section re-
gression models of the prices and qualities chosen by GPs in different markets with differing 
amounts of competition.  However, in the absence of restrictions on entry, the number of GPs 
in a market and hence the distance between GPs ( )  is endogenous which raises the possibil-
ity that a simple cross-section model will produce biased estimates of the effect of .     
 
With free entry into different markets, in equilibrium all markets will yield the same profit. 
Denote GP fixed cost of operating in the market by K (which can be taken to be a financial 
cost minus the monetary equivalent of any utility from the amenities in the market).  Substi-
tuting the optimal patient price and quality from (6) and (7) into(3), maximised GP profit is  
     
1
0
* 2 *1
2( ; , , , ) ( ; , , , ) ( ; ) ( ; , , , , )ih p t m m q t m dF t m h
D
DS D G G D G D T S G Tª º    ¬ ¼³     (10) 
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The equilibrium number of GPs and hence the distance between GPs is determined by the 
condition that GPs break even:  
*( ; , , , , ) 0t m h KS G T   
 
           (11)    
so that in equilibrium the distance between GPs is 
 ( , , , , , )t m h KG T              (12) 
Using the implicit function rule on Error! Reference source not found.  the effects of G, t 
etc on the equilibrium  are w /wG = * */GS S  etc and these are reported in the rightmost col-
umn of Table 1. 
 
Endogeneity of  will lead to biased estimates of the effect of competition if the estimated 
model omits variables which determine prices or qualities and are correlated with .  For 
example, the true model for the bulk-billing proportion is Fb =  ( ( , , , ); )bF t mD G T  = 
( ( , , , , ), , , , )bF m h K t mG T G T .  If the regression fails to include variables like T which affect 
both Fb and 
 
positively, the estimated effect of  on Fb will be positively biased.  Omission 
of variables like t which only affect Fb and are not correlated with  will not bias the estimat-
ed effect of , though it will lead to a loss of efficiency.   Finally, variables like K which only 
affect Fb though their effect on   should be omitted from the regression, though they could 
act as instruments for . We discuss the estimation of the regression models in more detail in 
section 4.2 after describing the data.  
 
 
4 Empirical Methods 
 
4.1 Data 
 
We use data from the first wave of the Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and 
Life (MABEL) survey, a prospective cohort/panel study of workforce participation, labour 
supply and its determinants among Australian doctors. The sampling frame is the Australian 
0HGLFDO3XEOLVKLQJ&RPSDQ\¶V$03&R0HGLFDO'LUHFWRU\DQDWLRQDOGDWDEDVHof all Aus-
tralian doctors, managed by the Australian Medical Association (AMA). Data was collected 
from June to December 2008. The questionnaire covered topics such as job satisfaction and 
attitudes to work; characteristics of work setting (public/private hospital, private practice); 
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workload (hours worked, on-call); finances (income, income sources); geographic location; 
demographics; and family circumstances (partner and children) (Joyce et al, 2010).  
 
The number of GPs responding in the first wave was 3906 (including 226 GP registrars 
(trainees)), a response rate of 19.36%. We restrict the study sample to GPs located in the ma-
jor conurbations in Australia. The areas outside these conurbations are very sparsely populat-
ed and GPs in them face different financial incentives and regulations to those in our study 
sample. After excluding rural GPs and those with incomplete data we had a study sample of 
1966 GPs.  Our estimation sample is 12% of the population of 16,382 GPs in urban areas in 
Australia in 2008 (population data from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010). 
Our estimation sample averages are 47% female (population 40%), age 50.7 years (popula-
tion 50.5), total hours worked 38.7 (population 37.7). Our sample over-represents female 
GPs, but in terms of age and working hours, our sample means are close to the population 
estimates from the AIHW. 
 
Prices 
The survey asks two questions about consultation fees. The first is ³Approximately what per-
centage of patients do you bulk bill/charge no co-payment?´We use the answers to measure 
the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed (Fb).   
 
The second question is ³What is your current fee for a standard (level B) consultation? (In-
clude Medicare rebate and patient co-payment. Please write amount in dollars; write 0 if you 
bulk bill 100% of your patients)´. We use the answers to measure the average gross price 
( nbp  +  m) charged to patients who are not bulk-billed. We believe the answer to this survey 
question is DJRRGPHDVXUHRID*3¶VSULFHVHWWLQJbehaviour since 88% of consultations in 
Australia are level B.   
 
Quality 
The GPs are asked ³+RZORQJGRHVDQDYHUDJHFRQVXOWDWLRQ ODVW"3OHDVHZULWHQXPEHURI
PLQXWHV´.  Since consultation length is positively correlated with measures of the quality of 
care including preventative care, lower levels of prescribing and some elements of patient 
satisfaction (Wilson and Childs 2002), we use this variable as a measure of the average quali-
ty of consultations ( q ).   
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Workload 
We use a variable measuring the number of patients each GP consults with as a proxy of the 
workload variable N = H/G in the theory model. The survey question used is: 
³In your most recent USUAL week at work, for around HOW MANY patients did 
you provide care? (Include new and existing patients in ALL SETTINGS²eg. 
hospital and private practice²procedures and  telephone consultations for day 
time and out of hours)´ 
 
Competition measure  
There is a large literature on measuring competition in healthcare markets (Gaynor and Town, 
2011).  Studies on markets for hospital care often calculate Herfindahl-Herschmann indices 
(HHIs) based on market share information.  Recent hospital market studies, such as Gaynor et 
al (2011), have used the approach of Kessler and McClellen (2000) and Gowrisankaran and 
Town (2003), to avoid the endogeneity problem that market share depends on a prices and 
qualities. These studies calculate the HHI from regression estimates of demand which include 
distance but not price or quality.  
 
Studies in physician markets generally have not been able to take this approach (with the ex-
ception of Schneider et al, 2008) because of the absence of data on SDWLHQWV¶UHVLGHQWLDOORFa-
tion.  Instead, most physician market studies have used physician density (physicians per cap-
ita in an area) (Bradford and Martin, 2000;  Johar, 2012; Richardson et al, 2006; Savage and 
Jones, 2004).  This approach has the disadvantage that all physicians in an area are assumed 
to face the same competitive pressure.  
 
Since we only have information on the number of consultations with the GPs in our sample, 
we are unable to compute HHIs, from actual or estimated demand, as this would require in-
formation on patient distances from GPs and the volume of consultations for each GP, not just 
those in our sample.   Instead we construct an individual GP level measure of competition: 
the distance between D*3¶s practice and her rival practices.   This approach follows from the 
model in section 3 where we use distance between GPs ( )
 
as a measure of competition. 
Competition measures which are purely geographically defined have also been used in the 
hospital competition literature (Propper et al, 2004; Propper et al, 2008; Bloom et al, 2013).  
Recent industrial organisation literature has emphasised the importance of distance to com-
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petitors, rather than market share measures on pricing decisions (Thomadsen 2005, Alderighi 
and Piga 2012).   Drawing on Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), who show that, in geographically 
isolated markets for professional services (including doctors and dentists) only the first three 
additional competitors in a market have a large effect on prices, we use the distance to the 
third nearest GP as our main measure of competition.  We also investigate the robustness of 
the measure by estimating models using the distance to the nearest and 5th nearest GP prac-
tice.9   
 
We construct the competition measures using data from AMPCo which covers the whole 
population of Australian GPs, not just those who responded to the MABEL survey.  For each 
MABEL respondent we calculated the road distance from their practice to the nearest, third 
nearest, and fifth nearest other GP practice in the AMPCo data, whether or not the other prac-
tices were MABEL respondents.  
 
GP and GP practice covariates 
We use individual GP and GP practice characteristics to control for differences in costs or 
preferences which may influence pricing decisions.  We include GP gender and whether they 
have a spouse or dependent children, as this may affect their marginal valuations of income 
and leisure.  GPs who went to an Australian medical school (as opposed to graduating over-
seas) may be perceived by their patients to be better trained or to be easier to communicate 
with.  GP experience (measured in ten year bands) may also affect demand as a proxy for 
quality. We know whether the GP is a partner or associate in a practice, rather than a salaried 
employee.  Partners and associates share in the profits of the practice which may give them 
an incentive to charge higher prices.  Partner or associate status also indicates seniority of the 
GP within the practice. We also control for the characteristics of the practice itself: practice 
size (number of GPs) and whether the practice is taxed as a company or not.  Practice size 
                                                 
9
 We cannot tell from our dataset which of the 28% of GPs in practices taxed as companies are working for a 
firm owning a chain of practices.   Distance to the third nearest practice would overstate the competitive pres-
sure for such practices if practices belonging to the same chain were close together.  We have mapped the loca-
tion of the practices belonging to two chains in Melbourne. We find that for the eight practices in the Medical 
One chain the shortest distance to another practice in the chain is 3.7km, compared with the average distance to 
third nearest practice in our sample of 1.5km.  For the 10 practices in the Healthscope chain the shortest distance 
is 3.5km.   We think therefore that our competition measure is appropriate whether or not the practice belongs to 
a chain. 
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may influence pricing decisions either because of the effect of economies of scale on practice 
costs or incentive effects (Gaynor and Pauly, 1990).  GPs working in a company may place a 
higher weight on profit.   
 
Area characteristics 
We also use data on area characteristics to capture other factors which may affect demand and 
cost conditions for GPs. We attribute them to GPs by their SUDFWLFH¶V location in postcode 
areas or Statistical Local Areas (SLAs).  The 1966 GPs in the estimation sample are located 
in 616 postcode areas with an average population of 18,487.  We use postcode area level data 
on the population age distribution, ethnicity, self-reported disability, and socio-economic sta-
tus measured by the Socio-Economic Index for Areas (SEIFA).  The SEIFA Index of Relative 
Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage is constructed by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics from 22 variables measuring education, income, occupational structure, employ-
ment status, and family structure. Higher values correspond to greater advantage and we ex-
pect postcodes with a higher SEIFA score to have greater valuation of quality and thus to 
have GPs who set higher prices and provide higher quality.    
 
The GPs in the estimation sample are located in 402 SLAs with an average population of 
33,164.  We attribute SLA level data on median house prices and population density to GPs 
via their practice address.  House prices may capture higher premise costs for GPs and richer 
populations who have a higher willingness to pay for GP services.  In some SLAs there are 
additional incentives for bulk-billing and we include a dummy variable to indicate these 
SLAs. 
 
Table 2 has descriptive statistics of the sample for all of the variables in the estimating equa-
tions.   
 
4.1 Estimation  
We estimate models for the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed Fb, the average gross 
price nbp +m (which equals m when the GP bulk-bills all patients), the average gross price for 
all patients  1 b nbm F p  , the average consultation length q , and the number of consulta-
tions per week N.  We use log transformations ln( nbp +m), ln(  1 b nbm F p  ) for the price 
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variables, quality ln( q ),  and workload ln(N) to allow for right skewness of the data and to 
yield coefficients as elasticities for ease of interpretation when explanatory variables are in 
log form.   
 
Linear models 
Our baseline model is a linear regression for GP j in area r 
 1 30 2jr jr r r rj jy GPdist GPchars AreacharsE E E HE     (13) 
where yjr is one of the five dependent variables. GPdistjr is a GP-practice specific measure of 
the distance between a GP and nearby practices, corresponding to  in the theory model; 
GPcharsjr is a vector of the characteristics of the GP and her practice; Areacharsr are charac-
teristics of the area in which the GP is located. 
 
The variable of particular interest is GPdistjr, which we interpret from our theory model as 
measuring the degree of competition, a greater distance between GPs indicating less intense 
competition.  Our first approach to identifying its effect is through variation in the outcomes y 
and competition GPdist across GPs j and areas r.  We have a rich set of GP and practice char-
acteristics but more limited area level information on patient characteristics which may shift 
demand. 7KH NH\ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ SUREOHP ZLWK WKLV DSSURDFK LV UHODWHG WR *3V¶ DELOLW\ WR
choose the area where they practice.  If there are unobserved factors which affect their choice 
of location and are correlated with both yjr and GPdistjr, then the error term Hjr will not be 
conditionally uncorrelated with GPdistjr thereby biasing the OLS estimate of ȕ1. For example, 
areas may differ in amenity.  High amenity areas may attract more GPs and a population of 
patients who have a greater willingness to pay for consultations.  Although we control for a 
range of area characteristics, they may not adequately capture all of these correlations.  The 
estimated effect of distance between GPs on prices will then be biased downward. 
 
Previous research has used area level characteristics, such as the supply of private schools, or 
expenditure on hotel services, or the proportion of the workforce who are professionals or 
managers, as instruments for GP supply (Richardson et al, 2006; Pauly and Sattertwhaite, 
1981). But such characteristics may also make areas more attractive to patients with unob-
served higher willingness to pay.  A better alternative would be to exploit exogenous policy 
changes to provide a natural experiment or geographical variations in regulation, such as the 
varying degree of barriers to entry considered by Schaumans and Verboven (2008). However, 
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there were no such exogenous changes or variations affecting the GPs in our study during the 
sample period.  
 
Our preferred strategy for overcoming this problem is to take advantage of the fact that we 
have a measure of competition which is GP specific (distance to rival GPs) and thus varies 
both between areas (over r) and within areas (over j within r).  There is an average of 4.7 GPs 
in each SLA in the estimation sample.  We make use of this within-area variation in three 
ways: random area effects, fixed area effects, and Mundlak (1978) models.  In the random 
effects model  
 0 1 2 3jr jr jr r r jry GPdist GPchars AreacharsE E E JE X      (14) 
rJ  LVD1ı2) random variable. In the fixed effects specification we include the rJ  as pa-
rameters and the rAreachars  are omitted from the model as they are perfectly collinear with 
the area fixed effects.  The Mundlak (1978) specification is 
1 2 3 1 20 r rjr jr j rr rr jy GPdist GPchars Areachars GPdist GPcharsE E E O O J XE       (15) 
where rJ  LVD1ı2) random effect and rGPdist , rGPchars  are the area means (for each r) 
of GPdistjr and GPcharsjr. 
 
The area random effects specification will yield a consistent estimate of ȕ1 if the unobserved 
area effects rJ  are conditionally uncorrelated with GPdistjr.  The fixed effects estimation is 
consistent for ȕ1 if ȣjr is uncorrelated with GPdistjr given rJ  and GPcharsjr.   The Mundlak 
specification is consistent if rJ  and ȣjr are uncorrelated with GPdistjr conditional on 
GPcharsjr, rGPdist , and rGPchars .  This is more stringent than the requirement for fixed 
effects since the included area mean variables must capture the correlation between unob-
served area characteristics and the GP varying characteristics (eg distance to other GP prac-
tices).  The fixed effect estimator ensures all the unobserved area characteristics are picked up 
by the area effect rJ .  
 
Using the Mundlak or fixed effects specification means that we need sufficient within-area 
variation in both yjr and GPdistjr areas to successfully identify ȕ1. The advantage of including 
area effects in the estimation is that it controls for characteristics of areas that would other-
wise be unobserved but which may influence prices, including demand side influences not 
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captured in the observed area level variables, and supply-side influences, such as the availa-
bility of other health services that may be substitutes for GP care (eg the number of pharma-
cies and emergency departments). We will obtain consistent estimates of the effect of GPdist 
on prices and quality provided that GP location decisions within areas are uncorrelated with 
within-area varying factors affecting pricing and quality decisions. This strategy works if 
doctors choose to practice in  an area, such as a suburb, while their exact location within the 
area is determined by factors which do not influence their price and quality decisions, such as 
the availability of vacant premises for the setting up of a practice. We believe that the location 
of vacant premises and town planning restrictions are plausibly exogenous and uncorrelated 
with GP pricing and quality.   
 
For the Mundlak and area fixed effects models ((14) and (15)) we use SLAs as the area, since 
there is more within-area variation than if we used the postcode as the area: there are an aver-
age of 4.9 GPs per SLA and 3.1 per postcode in the sample.   
 
The areas (SLAs) in our empirical specification do not correspond precisely to the separate 
markets in the theory model. In the theory model we assume that all GPs in a market face the 
same amount of competition (i.e. they are the same distance apart) and so make the same 
choices about prices and quality.   In the empirical specification our strategy for identifying 
the effect of competition requires that there is within-area variation in both distances between 
GPs and in price and consultation length.  To link the theoretical markets and the empirical 
areas we could assume that the empirical areas are made up of separate markets (so that there 
is within-area variation in competition, prices, and quality) but that the non-demand factors 
(K in the theory model) affecting GP supply are similar across the markets within the area.  
Alternatively, we could assume that each area corresponds to a single market but that GPs do 
not locate equi-distant from each other because of the exigencies of geography and planning 
controls. 10   
 
                                                 
10
 The assumption of equal spacing of GPs in the theory model is made for tractability since it is an extension of 
the Vickrey-Salop model to allow for price and quality discrimination and bulk billing.   Key predictions about 
the effect of competition (measured by the distance between GPs) are likely to hold under more realistic as-
sumptions about GP spacing.  For example, it is possible to show that, in the basic price setting Vickrey-Salop 
specification but with unequally spaced GPs, a GP will have a higher Nash equilibrium price if she is located 
further away from her two neighbouring GPs. 
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Tobit model 
 
The linear models do not make full use of the available data. When estimating the model for 
the average price to non-bulk-billed patients nbjp we ignore the information on the proportion 
of GP j¶Vpatients who are bulk-billed ( bjF ).  From the model in section 3 (see equation(7)), 
the profit maximising net price pi to patient i with taste Di is pi = ( ; )nb ip D   if Di t Db and pi = 
( ; )b ip D  = 0 if Di < Db, or pi = max{ ( ; )nb ip D  ,0}.  Thus, allowing for the variables determin-
ing the price to vary across GPs in different markets, the optimal net price to patient i of GP j 
is pij = max{ nbjp ,0}, and the optimal gross price is pij + m = max{ nbjp + m,m}. 
  
Using the same log transform as in the linear model, we define 
      ^ `*ln / ln max{ ,0} / max ,0nbij ij ij ijy p m m p m m yª º ª º     ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼          (16) 
where  * ln /nbij ijy p m mª º ¬ ¼ .  If we had data on the gross prices charged to patient i of GP j 
we could estimate a Tobit model with log likelihood 
  1ln 1 ln ln 1lnjS ij j jij ijj i y x xL d dE EV V VI
­ ½ª  º ª º§ · § ·° °    )® ¾« » « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹° °¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¯ ¿
¦ ¦  (17) 
where dij = 1 if the patient is bulk-billed and dij =0 otherwise,  Sj patients are treated by GP j 
and *max{ ,0} max{ ,0}ij ij j ijy y x E H    where Hij picks up all the unobserved patient i and 
GP j characteristics affecting the optimal price and is distributed N(0,V2).  Estimation of the 
model parameters E and V would yield estimates of the effect of competition on the expected 
price to non-bulk-billed patients, the probability that a patient is bulk-billed, and the expected 
gross price. 
 
Estimation using the log likelihood in (17) requires Sj observations of (yij, xj) for each GPj.   
However, we observe only the average price for non-bulk-billed patients nbjp and the propor-
tion bjF  who are bulk-billed.  Assuming that all non-bulk-billed patients have the same price 
we can replace yij = ln((pij + m)/m) in Error! Reference source not found. with yj = ln((
nb
jp m )/m) to get  
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2ln 1 ln ln ln 1j j jb bj j jj y x xL S F FE EV VI V
­ ½ª º§ · ª º§ ·° °    )« »¨ ¸® ¾« »¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹« » ¬ ¼° °© ¹¬ ¼¯ ¿
¦  (18) 
Making the further assumption that all GPs see the same number of patients (Sj = S), the val-
ues of E and V which minimise (18) do not depend on S.  
 
We use our data to create two observations for each GP of the form (yj,xj) = 
  ln / ,nbj jp m m xª º¬ ¼  and (0,xj) with weights (1 bjF ) and bjF  respectively and use the tobit 
command in Stata to estimate E and V.  
 
The vector of explanatory variable x is specified as in the linear model in equation (13).  We 
also estimate a version of the Tobit with the Mundlak area-average terms as in equation (15).   
 
If a GP sets different prices for different types of non bulk-billed patient, as in the theory 
model, the estimated Tobit model is a partial misspecification of the data generation process 
because we replace individual prices with average prices. In this case, the Tobit can be 
viewed as an alternative non-linear specification which makes better use of the available in-
formation than the separate linear models for prices and the bulk-billing rate.11  
 
The estimates of E and V yield estimates of three quantities of interest for each GP 
(i) the bulk-billing probability  
 Pr( 0 1 /)bj j j jF y x x E V   )           (19) 
(ii) the expectation of yj =  ln /nbjp m mª º¬ ¼ for non-bulk-billed patients 
 
[ | 0, ]j j jE y y x! ( / )jjx xE VO E V            (20) 
where ( / ) ( / ) / ( / )j j jx x xO E V I E V E V )  
(iii) the expectation of yj for all patients  ln ( /jp m mª º¬ ¼  =   ln 1 /b nbj jF p m mª º ¬ ¼
 [ ] Pr( 0 | ) / ) ([ | 0, ] )( /j j j j j j j j j jE y x y x E y y x xx xE V E VO E V ª º! !  ¬) ¼      (21) 
                                                 
11
 Alternatively, it is possible to show that a theory model in which each GP sets the same price for all her non 
bulk-billed patients yields the same predictions about average prices as the individual level discrimination mod-
el. This alternative model is more involved than for the individual level discrimination model and is available 
from the authors. 
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We report the estimated average marginal effects of our competition measure, distance to 
competing practices, and other variables on these three different measures of GP price setting.   
 
 
 
5 Results 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics. On average, the GPs in our sample bulk-bill (charge zero 
copayment to) 61 percent of their patients, 19.7 percent of GPs bulk-bill all of their patients 
and 1.6 percent of GPs bulk-bill none of their patients.  Therefore close to 80 percent of GPs 
bulk-bill some but not all of their patients. The average gross price for all patients is $42.06. 
In comparison, national data from Medicare show an average gross price for all patients in 
2008/9 of $42.8012 for GP services. Our data show the average price for non-bulk-billed pa-
tients is $50.10. With a Medicare rebate of $32.80, this implies an average out of pocket 
payment of just under $18.  In comparison, national Medicare data for 2008/9, which in-
cludes GPs in rural areas, shows that the average out of pocket payment for non-bulk-billed 
GP services was $21.50. 
 
We have responses from 1966 GPs in 1417 different practices.  GPs in the same practice do 
not appear to set the same price: the within practice standard deviation of the average price to 
non bulk-billed patients is $3.7 (compared to $11.6 in the overall sample) and the standard 
deviation of the within practice bulk billing rates is 9.8 percent (compared with 31.4 percent 
in the overall sample).  This suggests that GPs within practices have different mixes of pa-
tients.  
 
The average consultation time is 16.7 minutes and the average number of consultations per 
week is 111.  The average distance to the third nearest other practice is 1.5 km which is more 
than twice the distance to the nearest practice and two thirds of the distance to the 5th nearest 
practice.  
                                                 
12
 Medicare Statistics http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/medstat-jun12-tables-ba. 
Tables B1A and B2A (accessed 14 march 2014). These data are only available for all types of consultation 
(Level A-D), whilst our survey question refers to Level B consultations, which are the most common as they are 
88% of all GP consultations. 
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The table shows considerable within-area variation in the key dependent variables and the 
competition measure.  For example, for the average price variable, the standard deviation 
between areas is 7.9 and the standard deviation within areas is 7.2. These figures provide 
some justification for our strategy of exploiting within-area variation in the empirical analy-
sis.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Nearly half the GPs are female, which is similar to the proportion in other developed coun-
tries. Almost 20 percent are qualified overseas and most probably therefore not born in Aus-
tralia. Just under a half of GPs are partners or associates and so have a direct financial interest 
in  their practice.  Only 14 percent work as single-handed GPs.  
 
5.1 Average price to all patients 
 
Linear Models 
Table 3 presents detailed results for linear regression models where the dependent variable is 
the log of the gross price averaged over all patients seen by the GP: ln((1Fb) nbp + m).  All 
models in this and subsequent tables have standard errors corrected to allow for clustering at 
area (SLA) level.13 The size and significance of the key results are similar across the four 
model specifications.  A Hausman test comparing the area random and fixed effects models 
fails to reject the null of the random effects model for all four dependent variables (results 
available from authors).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The first row in Table 3 reports the coefficients and SEs for our preferred measure of compe-
tition: the log of the distance to the third-nearest GP-practice. Since the dependent variable is 
also log-transformed, the coefficients on the distance measure are elasticity estimates.  The 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all models: the greater the distance to 
                                                 
13
 The 1966 GPs are located in 1379 practices. We also allowed for clustering at practice level but this made 
little difference to the standard errors. 
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the 3rd nearest practice, the higher the average price charged by the GP.  The size of the effect 
is consistent across the alternative models, including the Mundlak and fixed effects models, 
which control for unobserved area-level characteristics.   
 
Tobit models 
Table 4 presents average marginal effects from two Tobit models of the average price to all 
patients in the practice. As in the linear models, the log transformation of the price measure 
means that the average marginal effects for the competition measure are average elasticities. 
The pattern of results is similar to the linear models but the estimated marginal effects of the 
competition measure are a little larger: 0.022 for the Tobit models compared to 0.018 for the 
equivalent linear models.  This could be due to the Tobit models making better use of infor-
mation on the non-trivial proportion (19.7%) of GPs who bulk-bill all patients.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
5.2 Bulk-billing, price to non-bulk-billed patients, quality and workload 
 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the marginal effects of the competition measure on four oth-
er aspects of GP decisions: the proportion of patients bulk-billed Fb, the log of average price 
to those not bulk-billed ln( nbp +m), average quality q   and workload N.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The theory model predictions about the effect of competition on the average net price to bulk 
billed patients ( nbp ) are ambiguous but the estimated effect of greater distance to the third 
nearest rival is positive.   The theory model predicts that the proportion of bulk billed patients 
will fall as this distance increases and the empirical results from all the empirical models 
support this.   We saw in Table 3 and 4 that the average price to all patients [ (1 )nb bp F  + m] 
increased with the distance between GPs and the results in Table 5 suggest that just under two 
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thirds of the effect arises from the reduction in the proportion who are bulk billed and one 
third from the increase in the price to those who are bulk billed.14  
  
Greater distance to rivals is associated with lower average quality as measured by average 
consultation time. However, the estimated effects are small and have p values greater than 
0.10.  The modest estimated impact of competition on consultation length may be because the 
theory model suggests that competition will only affect the quality supplied to the 40% of 
patients who are not bulk-billed. 
 
In the OLS and RE estimates distance to rivals is weakly negatively associated with workload 
(consultations per week).  The association is statistically insignificant in the models with area 
Mundlak or fixed effects. The theory predicts a positive relationship because, like other pa-
pers employing the Vickrey-Salop model, we make the simplifying assumption that the mar-
ket is covered so that we can focus on predictions about price and quality.  If some patients 
are deterred from demanding a consultation by higher prices then less intense competition, 
which increases price, could also reduce workload.15 
 
 
5.3 Effects of competition and patient socio-economic status 
 
The theory model suggests that the effect of competition on the average price to all patients 
and on average quality will be greater in areas where there is a greater average willingness to 
pay for quality.16  Table 6 reports the effects of distance to rival GPs and its interaction with 
                                                 
14
 The elasticity of the average price with respect to distance is  1 1(1 )( ) nb bp nb b p Fp F pH H H     and 
 1/nb nb bp p FH H H   is 0.36 using the Tobit Mundlak results   
15
 It would be possible to extend the Vickrey-Salop model to the case where total demand is not fixed.  For ex-
ample, one could assume that GPs were distributed around the road and patients were distributed on and outside 
the circular road.  Suitable choice of distance cost parameters and assumptions about the distribution of patients 
outside the circular road would yield an equilibrium in which GPs still compete (all patients on the road demand 
consultations) but the number of consumers outside the road demanding a consultation varies with the equilibri-
um price and quality. 
16
 In the theory model this is captured by higher T, a parameter which causes a first order stochastically dominat-
ing shift in the taste distribution function F(D;T).  
 26 
the SEIFA advantage/disadvantage index.  In the fixed effects and Mundlak models the inter-
action with the index of local area advantage is statistically significant in the models for aver-
age price to all patients and for bulk-billing.  In all cases, the effects of distance to local com-
petitors on the price or quality outcome is greater in areas of greater socio-economic ad-
vantage.  Thus distance to local competitors has a stronger positive effect on average price to 
non-bulk-billed patients and on average price to all patients in advantaged areas, and a 
stronger negative effect on bulk-billing in more advantaged areas. The interaction term is not 
significant in the quality model, though the direct effect of distance to other GPs on consulta-
tion time is now slightly greater in all the linear models and significant  in the fixed effect 
specification.17   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
5.4 Effects of covariates 
The effects of the covariates are consistent across the linear and non-linear (Tobit) models 
reported in Tales 3 and 4 and seem plausible.  Female GPs set higher prices. This is perhaps 
because there is greater willingness to pay for a consultation with female GPs who may be 
perceived to have better interpersonal skills (Roter et al, 1991) or because female patients 
may prefer to consult female doctors. Reyes (2006) found that US female obstetri-
cians/gynaecologists also charged higher fees than male obstetricians/gynaecologists. 
 
GPs graduated from an Australian medical school also set higher prices, suggesting that con-
sultations with them are regarded as being of higher quality.  Patients are also willing to pay 
higher prices for GPs with more experience, except for those with over 40 years of experi-
ence.  Partners or associates in practices set higher prices, presumably because they have a 
share in practice profits.  There is only a weak effect of the size of the practice.  GPs in areas 
with more advantaged patients set higher prices, suggesting that these patients have a higher 
willingness to pay.   
 
                                                 
17
 In all models we normalise the SEIFA index to have a mean of zero over the estimation sample.  Thus in the 
linear models the average marginal effect of competition is given by the coefficient on on the competition meas-
ure (ȕ1). 
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Disabled patients are likely to have a higher demand for consultations (which should drive up 
the price) but are also likely to have lower incomes which should lower the price.  The results 
suggest that the latter effect is dominant. GPs in areas with older patients set higher prices, 
possible because such patients have higher demands, higher incomes, and a greater cost of 
shopping around.  
 
Areas with financial incentives to bulk-bill patients have higher prices, possibly reflecting 
that these incentives are inadequate to offset the factors that drive high prices (and low bulk-
billing rates) in such areas.  Prices are higher in areas with higher house prices, either because 
this reflects a greater willingness to pay of the local population or higher premise costs. 
 
5.5 Robustness checks 
 
Table 7 presents results for average price where we use alternative measures of localised 
competition as the key explanatory variable. Using the log of distance to the fifth nearest GP 
practice gives a larger marginal effect (approximately 50% larger) of distance on the average 
price.  Using the log of distance to the nearest GP practice gives smaller estimates and with 
fewer statistically significant results than before.  We attribute this to the lack of variation 
(evidenced by a smaller standard deviation) in this variable compared to the other distance 
measures.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Table 8 has results of models for average price with different sets of covariates.  The first row 
of the table contains models with the log distance to 3rd nearest practice as the only covariate.  
In the OLS and Tobit model with no controls and no area effects, the estimated coefficient is 
much smaller and insignificant.  For models with area random effects, area Mundlak correc-
tion, and area fixed effects, the coefficient on log distance is similar to the models with a full 
set of controls.  In the second set of models we add the GP and practice covariates but not the 
area-level covariates.   Again, the models that do not account for area effects fail to find a 
statistically significant coefficient on the distance to nearby competitors, but with area ef-
fects, the models are similar to the full specification.  In the full specification there is little 
difference in the key results between the models with and without area effects. The results in 
Table 8 demonstrate the importance of accounting for area effects.  They also demonstrate 
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that in the full specification, the area-level covariates pick up this important variation, hence 
explaining why there is little difference between the different model results.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
An assumption of our empirical approach is that unobserved factors correlated with distance 
and pricing decisions are captured by the area level covariates and area fixed effects. One 
possible mechanism that would violate this assumption is if GPs with observable characteris-
tics which are less valued by patients, and which would tend to reduce the price they can 
charge, tend to locate further away from other GPs in the same area. We test for this possibil-
ity by regressing our competition measure, the log of the distance to the third nearest GP, on 
two characteristics of GPs likely to be valued by patients: GP experience and whether the GP 
qualified from an Australian medical school.  The results, presented in Table 9, show that 
qualifying from an Australian medical school and experience as a GP are not associated with 
distance to nearby GPs.18  
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
We also estimated models in which quality was measured as the square root (instead of the 
log) of consultation length, as implied by the quadratic cost specification in the theory model.  
We find that the effect of log distance to the third nearest competitor is insignificant and of a 
similar magnitude to the original specification. Results are available on request. 
 
6 Discussion  
 
This paper develops theoretical and empirical models of the relationship between localised 
competition, measured by distance between GP practices, and price and quality setting in a 
market for General Practitioner services. Our approach follows a strand in the IO and hospital 
market literatures which emphasize distance to nearby competitors as a determinant of prices 
in general IO models (Alderighi and Piga, 2012; Thomadsen, 2005; Gaynor and Vogt, 2003).   
 
                                                 
18
 We also find no significant relationship between distance and proxies of GP quality in models which also 
include other GP characteristics and area variables. These results are available on request. 
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Our empirical results generally support the predictions from the theory model set out in Table 
1.  Our preferred measure of competition, distance to third-nearest GP practice, is significant-
ly negatively associated with the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed Fb, positively 
associated with the average price to patients who are not bulk-billed nbp ,and with the aver-
age price to all patients p  = (1Fb) nbp .   
 
Although all models yield qualitatively similar results, our preferred empirical specification is 
the Tobit model with the area-Mundlak adjustment. It combines the information on GP deci-
sions on prices and the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed and allows for area level 
unobservables. This model yields a small estimated elasticity of 0.022 for the average price to 
all patients with respect to distance to third nearest GP.  A one standard deviation (0.975) in-
crease in the log distance to the third nearest GP practice implies a $0.90 increase in the aver-
age gross price and a 3.3 percentage point fall in the number of patients bulk-billed.  Shifting 
a GP from the lowest decile of the distribution of distance to third nearest GP (0.29km) to the 
top decile (3.0km) is associated with $2.17 increase in the average price and a 7.9 percentage 
point reduction in the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed (ie face zero copayment).    
 
We also find that in areas with higher socio-economic status, an increase in the distance to 
rival GP practices is associated with a larger increase in price and a larger reduction in the 
proportion of patients bulk-billed.  This finding matches the prediction from our theoretical 
model that the average taste for quality in a market (ș), which we proxy with socio-economic 
status, increases the responsiveness of price to competition.  The finding is also in line with 
Johar (2012) who finds the relationship between patient income and prices charged is larger 
in areas with higher GP density.   
 
We interpret the results from the SLA fixed effects and Mundlak models as evidence of a 
causal effect of distance to nearby competitors on GP pricing decisions.  We think it reasona-
ble to assume factors affecting GP location and/or GP pricing operate across SLAs and not 
within them.    In support of the assumption, we found no evidence that GPs with characteris-
tics less valued by patients, and who would therefore have to charge lower prices, locate fur-
ther away from other GPs in the same SLA (Table 9). 
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The fact that we find similar sized effects in models with and without area effects suggests 
that our area-level variables capture most area-level factors that are correlated with pricing 
decisions and our measures of competition.  Our results are also broadly in agreement with 
previous studies of the Australian market using area-level data which find that higher GP 
density increases the bulk-billing rate (Richardson et al 2006, Savage and Jones 2004). 
 
There has been increasing concentration in the market for GP services in Australia.  Between 
2003 and 2008, although the number of GPs in Australia grew by 4.6 percent the number of 
GP practices fell by 6.7 percent (Moretti et al 2010).  Both state and federal government poli-
cy has encouraged the formation of larger practices, with current policy funding the estab-
OLVKPHQWVRIµ*36XSHUFOLQLFV¶,QFUHDVLQJFRQFHQWUDWLRQFRXOGDOVREHH[SODLQHGE\DWUHQG
for private companies to own chains of large GP practices.   There has also been an increase 
in concentration in the US (Liebhaber and Grossman, 2007).  Our results suggest that the 
trends to increasing concentration in markets for physician services may lead to higher prices. 
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Appendix.  Derivation of comparative static results in Table 1 
  
a)  From (8) and (9),  reductions in competition reduce the proportion of patients who are 
bulk-billed 
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The first term in the last line is positive but the second is negative since Įb is decreasing in  
(less competition reduces the threshold type at which the GP sets a positive price).  Intuitive-
ly, reductions in competition increase the price for those already facing a positive price (the 
first term) but dilutes the average price to paying patients because of those patients who were 
previously not charged (ie were bulk-billed) and who now pay but face a low price (the sec-
ond term). If there are sufficient of these payers the average price for those not bulk-billed 
will fall. 
 
c)  The effect of on average quality for all patients ( q ) is, from (6) and(7), 
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where we use the fact that quality for bulk-billed patients is positive so that the square brack-
eted term in the second line is negative from(6).   
 
 
d) The effect on average net price  1 b nbp F p  is 
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Table 1.  Comparative static properties 
  Ceteris paribus effect on prices, 
bulk-billing, quality, workload 
Effect on distance between 
GPs ( ) with entry 
Increase in  nbp  Fb p
 
q
 
N  
 
 ?  +  + NA 
t  ?  +  0 0 
m   + + + 0  
G   +   0 + 
T  +  + + 0  
h  0 0 0 0 +  
K  0 0 0 0 0 + 
nbp : average net price (excess over Medicare reimbursement m) paid by patients who are not bulk-billed;  Fb: 
proportion of patients who are bulk-billed (pay nothing out of pocket); p  = (1  Fb) nbp : average over all pa-
tients of net price paid (in excess over Medicare fee m);   q :  average quality (consultation length);  N : consul-
tations per GP;   : distance between GPs;  t: patient travel cost; m: Medicare reimbursement; G : quality cost 
parameter; T : shift parameter for distribution of patient marginal valuation of quality (higher T  implies higher 
average valuation); K: GP fixed costs net of value of local amenities. 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics 
 Mean SD  
overall 
Min Max SD between and 
within areas 
Dependent Variables 
    Between 
(n=402) 
Within 
(n=4.89) 
Av price all patients: m +  (1-Fb) nbp  42.063 9.712 32.800 150.000 7.947 7.206 
Patients bulk-billed (%): Fb 60.95 31.43 0.00 100.00 24.40 23.92 
Bulk-billed zero patients (%) 0.016 0.127 0.000 1.000   
Bulk-billed all patients (%) 0.197 0.398 0.000 1.000   
Av price to non-bulk-billed: nbp + m 50.11 11.61 32.80 150.00 8.88 8.86 
Consult time (mins) 16.68 5.63 5.00 60.00 3.50 4.93 
Number of consults/week 111.3 60.7 1.0 560.0 40.2 51.5 
Competition Variables       
Closest GP Practice (km) 0.696 0.988 0.000 9.434 1.106 0.613 
Third closest GP practice (km) 1.519 1.592 0.003 17.448 1.748 0.904 
Ln(Third closest GP practice (km)) 0.002 0.975 -5.954 2.859 0.835 0.602 
Fifth closest GP practice (km) 2.166 1.977 0.067 19.005 2.232 0.959 
GP and Practice Variables       
Female GP 0.472 0.499 0.000 1.000   
Spouse 0.867 0.339 0.000 1.000   
Children 0.640 0.480 0.000 1.000   
Australian Medical School 0.814 0.389 0.000 1.000   
Experience 10-19 years 0.208 0.406 0.000 1.000   
Experience 20-29 years 0.366 0.482 0.000 1.000   
Experience 30-39 years 0.265 0.441 0.000 1.000   
Experience 40+ years 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000   
GP registrar 0.035 0.183 0.000 1.000   
Partner or associate 0.455 0.498 0.000 1.000   
Practice taxed as company 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000   
Practice size: 2-3 GPs 0.169 0.375 0.000 1.000   
Practice size: 4-5 GPs 0.200 0.400 0.000 1.000   
Practice size: 6-9 GPs 0.326 0.469 0.000 1.000   
Practice size: 10+ GPs 0.160 0.366 0.000 1.000   
Area Variables       
SEIFA Index of adv/disadv 0.000 1.000 -4.521 2.242   
Incentive area 0.228 0.420 0.000 1.000   
Median House price ($0,000) 55.522 29.379 16.550 302.250   
Proportion of residents U15 0.177 0.048 0.025 0.293   
Proportion 65+ 0.134 0.045 0.023 0.309   
Proportion disabled 0.039 0.014 0.006 0.091   
Proportion NW Europe 0.082 0.040 0.011 0.269   
Proportion SE Europe 0.049 0.042 0.005 0.301   
Proportion SE Asia 0.042 0.051 0.002 0.422   
Proportion Other 0.096 0.082 0.002 0.496   
Popn density (pop/km2) ('000) 2.047 1.609 0.019 8.757   
Note: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample of 1966 GPs.  Area variables are measured at SLA level for the 
incentive area dummy, population density and median house prices, and at postcode level for all others. For the 
regression models we standardise the SEIFA variable to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one. For 
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Table 3: Linear models of average price to all patients 
  OLS   R.E.   Mundlak   F.E.   
Explanatory Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   
ln(3rd closest GP pr) 0.018 0.005 *** 0.018 0.005 *** 0.018 0.007 *** 0.017 0.006 *** 
Female GP 0.041 0.010 *** 0.041 0.010 *** 0.041 0.011 *** 0.040 0.011 *** 
Spouse 0.005 0.012 
 
0.009 0.012 
 
0.011 0.013 
 
0.014 0.013 
 Children 0.006 0.010 
 
0.005 0.010 
 
0.005 0.010 
 
0.008 0.010 
 Australian Medical School 0.074 0.010 *** 0.071 0.010 *** 0.069 0.012 *** 0.070 0.012 *** 
Experience 10-19 years 0.042 0.019 ** 0.042 0.018 ** 0.042 0.019 ** 0.041 0.019 ** 
Experience 20-29 years 0.026 0.018 
 
0.028 0.017 
 
0.034 0.018 * 0.032 0.019 * 
Experience 30-39 years 0.028 0.019 
 
0.033 0.018 * 0.040 0.019 ** 0.040 0.020 ** 
Experience 40+ years -0.024 0.020 
 
-0.018 0.019 
 
-0.005 0.021 
 
-0.005 0.021 
 Registrar -0.008 0.021 
 
0.001 0.021 
 
0.013 0.021 
 
0.011 0.021 
 Partner or associate 0.038 0.010 *** 0.038 0.010 *** 0.037 0.011 *** 0.037 0.011 *** 
Company 0.012 0.010 
 
0.008 0.009 
 
0.004 0.010 
 
0.004 0.010 
 Practice size: 2-3 GPs -0.012 0.016 
 
-0.012 0.015 
 
-0.011 0.016 
 
-0.012 0.016 
 Practice size: 4-5 GPs 0.019 0.016 
 
0.024 0.016 
 
0.034 0.018 * 0.032 0.018 * 
Practice size: 6-9 GPs 0.032 0.014 ** 0.030 0.014 ** 0.030 0.015 * 0.030 0.016 * 
Practice size: 10+ GPs 0.027 0.017 
 
0.023 0.017 
 
0.018 0.018 
 
0.011 0.019 
 
 SEIFA adv/disadv 0.038 0.013 *** 0.035 0.013 *** 0.035 0.013 *** 
  
 Incentive Area 0.042 0.016 *** 0.040 0.017 ** 0.040 0.016 ** 
  
 Median house price 0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 
  
 Percentage U15 -0.554 0.177 *** -0.525 0.186 *** -0.520 0.186 *** 
  
 Percentage 65+ 0.239 0.202 
 
0.304 0.200 
 
0.311 0.194 
   
 Percentage disabled -0.799 0.814 
 
-1.026 0.809 
 
-1.021 0.804 
   
 Percentage NW Europe 0.013 0.184 
 
-0.047 0.188 
 
-0.057 0.198 
   
 Percentage SE Europe -0.548 0.184 *** -0.468 0.189 ** -0.472 0.191 ** 
  
 Percentage SE Asia 0.201 0.170 
 
0.104 0.173 
 
0.092 0.173 
   
 Percentage Other 0.067 0.107 
 
0.105 0.107 
 
0.119 0.106 
   
 Pop per km2 -0.001 0.005 
 
-0.002 0.005 
 
-0.003 0.005 
   
 State dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 Local area random effects No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Local area averages No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Local Area FE's No 
 
No   Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs 1966   1966   1966   1966   
R-squared 0.289   0.287   0.297   0.078   
Notes: Dependent variable is ln( )p  = ln[m + (1-Fb) nbp ] where m is the Medicare rebate, nbp  is the average price to patients who 
are not bulk-billed and Fb  is the proportion of patients who are bulk-billed.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering at SLA level.  
*: p < 0.10, **: p< 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (two tailed).  All regression models include a constant term. 
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Table 4: Tobit models of average price to all patients 
 
Tobit Tobit with Mundlak 
Explanatory Variable  
Marg 
eff. S.E. 
Marg 
eff S.E. 
ln(3rd closest GP pr) 0.022 0.006 *** 0.022 0.007 *** 
Female GP 0.041 0.009 *** 0.042 0.010 *** 
Spouse 0.013 0.012 
 
0.019 0.012 
 Children 0.003 0.010 
 
0.002 0.010 
 Australian Medical 
School 0.091 0.013 *** 0.087 0.014 *** 
Experience 10-19 years 0.038 0.019 ** 0.046 0.019 ** 
Experience 20-29 years 0.024 0.019 
 
0.040 0.019 ** 
Experience 30-39 years 0.025 0.019 
 
0.043 0.019 ** 
Experience 40+ years -0.032 0.022 
 
-0.003 0.022 
 Registrar -0.007 0.023 
 
0.017 0.022 
 Partner or associate 0.040 0.010 *** 0.037 0.011 *** 
Company 0.011 0.010 
 
0.005 0.010 
 Practice size: 2-3 GPs -0.003 0.016 
 
0.000 0.017 
 Practice size: 4-5 GPs 0.027 0.016 * 0.042 0.018 ** 
Practice size: 6-9 GPs 0.035 0.014 ** 0.034 0.015 ** 
Practice size: 10+ GPs 0.026 0.017 
 
0.016 0.018 
 
 SEIFA adv/disadv 0.048 0.011 *** 0.045 0.011 *** 
Incentive Area 0.046 0.015 *** 0.045 0.015 *** 
Median house price 0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 
Percentage U15 -0.560 0.166 *** -0.574 0.169 *** 
Percentage 65+ 0.311 0.192 
 
0.345 0.184 * 
Percentage disabled -1.080 0.732 
 
-1.224 0.724 * 
Percentage NW Europe -0.109 0.177 
 
-0.156 0.181 
 Percentage SE Europe -0.582 0.214 *** -0.566 0.214 *** 
Percentage SE Asia 0.055 0.184 
 
0.008 0.181 
 Percentage Other 0.067 0.113 
 
0.092 0.112 
 Pop per km2 0.000 0.004 
 
-0.001 0.004 
 State dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 Local area random effects No 
 
No 
 Local area averages No 
 
Yes 
 Local Area FE's No 
 
No   
Obs 1966   1966   
Pseudo - R2 0.010   0.104   
Dependent variable: ln[m + (1-Fb)
nbp /m] = ln[ (1 ) ]b nbm F p    ln m .  The observations are weighted by the 
proportion of patients who are bulk-billed, as described in section 4. Average marginal effects are reported.  
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at SLA level.   
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Table 5: Effects of competition (log distance to 3rd nearest GP) on price to non bulk-billed patients, bulk billing rate, quality, and workload 
Dependent Variable 
OLS R.E. Mundlak F.E. Tobit Tobit with Mundlak 
Coef S.E.   Coef  S.E.   Coef S.E.   Coef  S.E.   Marg eff  S.E.   Marg eff  S.E.   
Log average price to non-bulk-billed 
patients: ln( nbp + m) 
                  
0.019 0.008 ** 0.018 0.008 ** 0.019 0.011 * 0.018 0.011 * 0.017 0.004 *** 0.017 0.005 *** 
 
                  Bulk-billing rate: Fb 
-3.009 0.800 *** -2.945 0.762 *** -3.159 0.959 *** -3.090 0.940 *** -3.265 0.832 *** -3.369 0.106 *** 
 
              
Log of consult time: ln( q ) -0.007 0.008  -0.007 0.008  -0.015 0.011  -0.016 0.011  N/A N/A 
 
              
Log of consultations/week: ln(N) 
-0.029 0.017 * -0.030 0.017 * -0.030 0.023   -0.027 0.022   N/A N/A 
                                    
 Notes: Table reports coefficients for linear models, and average marginal effects for Tobit models, of  log distance to the 3rd closest other GP practice.  Each coefficient and standard error 
represents a different model estimation. Models also contain covariates in full models reported in Tables 3 and 4.  *: p < 0.10, **: p< 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (two tailed). 
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Table 6: Average marginal effects of competition on price and quality: interaction with socio-economic status  
 Dependent Variable OLS   R.E.  Mundlak   F.E.   
 Explanatory variables Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   
 Dep Var: log  ave price to non bulk-
billed: ln( )nbm p   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ln(3rd closest GP) 
   ln(3rd closest GP)*SEIFA  
0.017 0.008 ** 0.017 0.008 ** 0.021 0.011 ** 0.022 0.011 ** 
-0.004 0.007 
 
-0.002 0.007 
 
0.009 0.009 
 
0.012 0.009 
 
 Dep Var: bulk-billing rate Fb 
            ln(3rd closest GP) 
ln(3rd closest GP)*SEIFA  
-3.105 0.886 *** -3.225 0.838 *** -3.713 1.023 *** -3.783 1.011 *** 
-0.301 0.800 
 
-0.830 0.745 
 
-1.738 0.872 ** -2.177 0.858 ** 
Dep Var: log average price  
ln (1 )b nbm F pª º ¬ ¼   
            ln(3rd closest GP) 0.018 0.006 *** 0.018 0.006 *** 0.021 0.007 *** 0.021 0.007 *** 
   ln(3rd closest GP)*SEIFA  
-0.002 0.005 
 
0.001 0.005 
 
0.008 0.006 
 
0.012 0.006 ** 
Dep var: log consult time ln( )q   
            ln(3rd closest GP) 
ln(3rd closest GP)*SEIFA  
-0.005 0.007 
 
-0.005 0.007 
 
-0.014 0.011 
 
-0.060 0.011 *** 
0.008 0.007   0.008 0.007   0.001 0.011   -0.001 0.011   
 Notes: Table reports coefficients for linear models of  log distance to the 3rd closest other GP practice and its interaction with SEIFA an index higher values of which correspond to higher so-
cio-economic advantage. Models also contain covariates in full models reported in Tables 3 and 4.  *: p < 0.10, **: p< 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (two tailed). 
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Table 7: Effect of competition on average price to all patients: alternative measures of competition   
Dep Var: log average price = 
ln[m+ (1-FB)* nbp ] 
OLS   R.E.   Mundlak   F.E.   Tobit Tobit with Mundlak 
Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   Marg eff  S.E.   Marg eff S.E.   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
      ln(closest GP pr) 0.007 0.003 ** 0.006 0.003 ** 0.006 0.003 * 0.005 0.003  0.009 0.003 *** 0.007 0.004 ** 
 
                  
ln(3rd closest GP pr) 0.018 0.005 *** 0.018 0.005 *** 0.018 0.007 *** 0.017 0.006 *** 0.022 0.006 *** 0.022 0.007 *** 
 
                  
ln(5th closest GP pr) 0.027 0.008 *** 0.026 0.007 *** 0.031 0.009 *** 0.029 0.009 *** 0.033 0.008 *** 0.038 0.011 *** 
 Notes: dependent variable is log of average price ln[m+(1-Fb) nbp ].  Each coefficient and standard error represents a different model estimation. Models also contain covariates in the models 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. *: p < 0.10, **: p< 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (two tailed). 
 
 
Table 8: Effect of competition on average price to all patients: alternative sets of covariates  
Dep Var: log average 
price  
=  ln[m+ (1-FB)* nbp ] 
OLS   R.E.   Mundlak   F.E.   Tobit Tobit with Mundlak 
Coeff. S.E.  Coeff. S.E  Coeff. S.E.   Coeff. S.E.   Marg eff  S.E.   Marg eff  S.E.   
 
                  ln(3rd closest GP pr) 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.005 *** 0.018 0.007** 0.018 0.007** 0.008 0.008 0.021 0.007*** 
with no other covariates1                   
 
            
Only GP and  0.004 0.007 0.012 0.005 ** 0.017 0.006 *** 0.017 0.006 *** 0.008 0.007 0.020 0.007 *** 
practice covariates2                   
 
            
Full specification3 0.018 0.005 *** 0.018 0.005 *** 0.018 0.007 *** 0.017 0.006 *** 0.022 0.006 *** 0.022 0.007 *** 
  
                                    
Notes: dependent variable is log of average price ln[m+(1-Fb) nbp ].  Each coefficient and standard error represents a different model estimation.  1 Models include constant, ln distance to 3rd 
nearest practice. The RE and FE models include random and fixed area effects and the Mundlak models include the area mean of the distance variable.  2Models are as in previous case but with 
the addition of the GP and practice covariates but with no area level covariates. 3Full specification as reported in tables 3 and 4.   *: p < 0.10, **: p< 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (two tailed). 
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Table 9: Regressions of log distance to competitors on proxies of GP quality 
 
OLS R.E. Mundlak F.E. 
 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Australian Medical School -0.037 0.073 0.005 0.055 0.031 0.057 0.031 0.057 
Experience 10-19 years 0.076 0.117 0.020 0.077 0.008 0.078 0.008 0.078 
Experience 20-29 years -0.002 0.110 -0.012 0.081 -0.014 0.083 -0.014 0.083 
Experience 30-39 years 0.078 0.119 -0.009 0.075 -0.027 0.076 -0.027 0.076 
Experience 40+ years 0.012 0.115 0.019 0.092 0.020 0.095 0.020 0.095 
Notes: Dependent variable: log distance to 3rd nearest GP practice. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at SLA level.  *: p < 0.10, **: p< 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (two tailed).  All regression 
models also include a constant but no covariates. 
 
